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Slovakia in the EU:  
An Unexpected Success Story?
by Milan Nič, Marek Slobodník, and Michal Šimečka
Summary
Slovakia has emerged as an unlikely success story of  the 2004 EU enlargement. 
The country’s first decade as a member state was marked by robust growth – spur-
red by pro-market reforms of  the early 2000s – and relative economic resilience 
and political stability during the global economic crisis. Thematic priorities on the 
EU level have included cohesion policy, energy, EU enlargement, and the Euro-
pean Neighborhood Policy (ENP). Slovak diplomacy has seen regional groupings 
– above all the Visegrad format – as the most effective way of  pursuing its policy 
preferences. As the only eurozone member in the Visegrad Group (V4), Slovakia 
remains a reliable if  somewhat passive supporter of  deeper European integration, 
supporting a fiscally responsible approach. This policy course reflects a broad pro-
European consensus among relevant political actors in Bratislava and continued 
public support for EU and eurozone membership. Going forward, Slovakia faces 
steep structural challenges (high unemployment, regional disparities, social exclu-
sion of  Roma), and needs to recalibrate its export-led and industry-heavy growth 
model toward higher added value and innovation.
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Slovakia in the EU:  
An Unexpected Success Story?
by Milan Nič, Marek Slobodník, and Michal Šimečka
Slovakia has had a good first decade in the EU. 
The country had initially been counted among 
the more troublesome of  the post-communist 
transition states, owing to the authoritarian abuses 
and incompetence of  Vladimir Mečiar’s cabinets 
in the 1990s. In 2004, it barely scraped into the 
cohort of  acceding states. Ten years later, however, 
Slovakia stands out as a success story of  the 2004 
enlargement. It has exacted tangible benefits from 
membership while being, with few exceptions, a 
stabilizing element amid the eurozone crisis. Popu-
lar support for the EU remains strong, with a 
recent Eurobarometer survey noting that support 
for the common currency is at 78 percent.1 Greater 
EU integration is still seen as a guarantor of  the 
country’s prosperity and stability. 
Before the global economic crisis, Slovakia enjo-
yed a period of  rapid economic growth (2002–08), 
averaging approximately 6 percent of  GDP annu-
ally – triple the eurozone average at the time. The 
boom, which earned the country the nickname 
“Tatra Tiger” (after the local Tatra mountain range), 
can be traced to the structural reforms undertaken 
before joining the EU and to the foreign direct 
investment that those reforms attracted. The Slo-
vak economy, shielded from currency volatility 
and trusted by foreign investors, proved resilient 
enough to rebound from the 2009–10 downturn 
without inflicting irreparable damage to public 
finances.
Unlike its Visegrad neighbors, Slovakia managed 
to embed itself  in the innermost tier of  European 
integration, joining the eurozone in 2009. Lately, 
Slovakia has also been playing a stabilizing role in 
the region. Bilateral relations with Hungary, bur-
dened by a difficult past, have never been healthier. 
In contrast to the recent government instability in 
Prague and the centralization of  power in Budapest, 
politics in Bratislava remain stable, centrist, and lar-
gely free of  anti-European populism.
This relatively benign context has allowed succes-
sive Slovak governments to pursue a pragmatic but 
responsible EU policy, grounded in the strategic 
imperative of  sticking to the EU mainstream and 
eurozone integration. Save for the dramatic parlia-
mentary vote on the bailout package for Greece in 
November 2011, Bratislava backed all of  the crisis 
response measures – from the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM) through fiscal compact to the 
banking union – without much controversy or even 
public attention at home. The current prime minis-
ter, Robert Fico, signaled in late 2013 that he would 
welcome even tighter integration in fiscal and eco-
nomic matters; that a leader in today’s Europe can 
make such a statement without fears of  a nationa-
list pushback is a telling sign of  just how robust 
Slovakia’s domestic consensus on European affairs 
has become. 
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In fact, a broadly pro-integration agenda is 
espoused by almost all main parties, regardless of  
ideological persuasion, and underpinned by voters’ 
continued trust in the European project and euro-
zone membership. This has engendered a degree 
of  continuity and consistency in European policy 
unseen in any other Visegrad country: Slovakia’s 
bid for eurozone membership, for instance, was set 
in motion in the mid-2000s by the center-right coa-
lition of  Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda and duly 
completed (with credit duly claimed) by the first 
government of  Robert Fico, Dzurinda’s arch-rival, 
who otherwise worked to undo his predecessor’s 
signature neo-liberal reforms. The downside of  
the tacit domestic consensus on Slovakia’s Euro-
pean policy is that it choked any meaningful public 
debate on the country’s place in Europe’s changing 
institutional landscape. There is also a lack of  
interest in EU issues among a large part of  the 
country’s political and intellectual elites, a sort of  
passive consumerism of  EU integration that may 
yet come back to haunt the country’s instinctively 
pro-European establishment.
The first part of  this paper will provide a retros-
pective overview of  Slovakia’s EU membership and 
focus on the main turning points in its relations 
with the EU, including in the pre-accession period. 
It will also examine the determinants of  Slovakia’s 
predominantly pro-European outlook. Two issues 
will be discussed in more detail: 1) the trauma 
of  “being left out” from the initial accession pro-
cess and the extraordinary effort of  “catching up” 
with the rest of  the Visegrad Group in the early 
2000s; and 2) joining the eurozone in 2009 and 
the country’s subsequent ambivalent position on 
bailouts of  indebted southern members, which 
eventually led to the collapse of  the Slovak govern-
ment in 2011. The second part of  the paper will 
describe Slovak priorities in the EU and Economic 
Monetary Union (EMU), its energy and climate 
policy, and finally its trade and economic relations. 
1. Retrospective Overview 
1.1. The trauma of being left out 
The analysis of  Slovakia’s European policy cannot 
be divorced from a consideration of  its dome-
stic politics. Following the peaceful breakup of  
Czechoslovakia in 1992, internal political polariza-
tion was starkly reflected in Slovakia’s international 
position. Between 1992 and 1998, the populist 
prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar, and his party, the 
Movement for Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), made 
a series of  undemocratic decisions. These led to 
the country’s growing isolation in Europe. Slovakia 
quickly fell behind its neighbors in the integration 
process. Its accession to the OECD was postponed 
in 1996 due to a lag in the market reforms. In 1997, 
reformist opposition leaders and a large part of  
society were dismayed to watch as Slovakia’s three 
Visegrad neighbors were invited to join NATO, 
and later to start accession talks with the EU. The 
European Commission pointed out a long list 
of  deficits in the area of  democracy and human 
rights.2 Out of  all ten applicants, Slovakia was the 
only one that did not satisfy the so-called “Copen-
hagen political conditions” for EU membership 
talks. Being left out of  EU and NATO enlarge-
ment in 1997 was one of  the main sources of  the 
country’s soul-searching and identity crises, which 
eventually culminated in political change.3
The turning point came in the October 1998 elec-
tions. A broad democratic coalition, unified by 
opposition to Mečiar and the fear of  falling further 
behind the region’s integration mainstream, defea-
ted the HZDS party. Despite the new coalition’s 
heterogeneous composition, including Catholic 
conservatives, free-market liberals, former com-
munists, and ethnic Hungarians, Prime Minister 
Mikuláš Dzurinda managed to keep the multi-party 
government together for a full four-year term.4 Its 
main focus was on the strategic goal of  getting the 
country back on the EU and NATO integration 
track and on reviving the stagnating economy.
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At the end of  1999, the EU recognized Bratislava’s 
progress and invited the country to open accession 
talks, which began in February 2000, almost two 
years after the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus. The main prefe-
rence of  the Slovak government was to conclude 
the accession talks as early as possible and join the 
EU with the first group of  accession countries 
(along with the rest of  the Visegrad Group). This 
goal was based on a wide political consensus in 
Bratislava; the only controversial issue that sparked 
a domestic debate – though without much impact 
on the course of  membership negotiations – was 
the Slovak government’s commitment to close 
down the two Soviet-era nuclear power reactors in 
Jaslovské Bohunice in 2006 and 2008 respectively. 
The opposition, which already included Fico’s 
newly established populist center-left SMER party, 
criticized the government for giving a premature 
pledge to close the plant, weakening the country’s 
profile in the energy sector, and for bowing to 
pressure from Brussels and neighboring Austria. 
For Slovak diplomats and negotiators, it was clear 
that decommissioning the two aging reactors in 
Jaslovské Bohunice was a precondition to EU 
accession; they focused more on securing higher 
amounts of  EU funds to cover the associated costs. 
The possibility of  “catching up” with the other 
Visegrad countries and entering the EU at the same 
time was anything but obvious at the time.5 The 
European Commission praised the hard work of  
the Dzurinda government and emphasized that the 
process was open to all qualifying candidate coun-
tries. During the talks, Slovaks could also benefit 
from advice and experiences shared by the Czech 
Republic, which had a similar legal system, a legacy 
of  the former common state. Other factors also 
played a role. As senior Commission official Dirk 
Meganck explained in a public speech in Bratislava, 
“Slovakia is so much at the core of  Europe that 
different accession dates for the various Visegrad 
countries could raise both external border and 
trade issues, which should ideally be avoided.”6 
With Slovakia left on the outside, the new EU sta-
tes of  Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic 
would find the job of  policing the Union’s eastern 
borders greatly extended. More importantly, if  Slo-
vakia and the Czech Republic were to join at the 
same time, it would help avoid major difficulties 
concerning their existing customs union. 
Benefiting from a positively inclined regional and 
European context, Slovakia finished accession talks 
in time to join the EU as a part of  the 2004 enlar-
gement, only five and a half  years after Mečiar’s 
ouster. The country thus escaped the fate of  Bulga-
ria and Romania, which had to wait until 2007. 
Joining the Union had wide support among Slovak 
citizens. An October 2003 opinion poll had 61 
percent of  respondents saying that Slovakia’s mem-
bership would benefit Slovak citizens, compared to 
30 percent who said it would not. The membership 
referendum showed even stronger support: 94 
percent for and 6 percent against, with a turnout 
of  52 percent,7 compared with an 84 percent to 
16 percent ratio in Hungary (with a turnout of  45 
percent), and 77 percent to 23 percent in the Czech 
Republic (with a turnout of  55 percent).8
The initial trauma of  being left out and then having 
to catch up with the others undoubtedly shaped 
Slovakia’s pro-European consensus. The legacy of  
misrule and rejection by Western institutions in the 
1990s has long continued to inform the way Slovak 
elites – and a large bloc of  voters – perceive EU 
integration. In the immediate post-Mečiar period, 
the main motif  was to use the historical oppor-
tunity to anchor the country’s young and weak 
institutions in a stronger European framework. 
Secondly, the experience produced a still-powerful 
narrative, whereby Brussels institutions are seen as 
the ultimate safeguard against government abuse 
and incompetence (including fiscal profligacy). 
Thirdly, the memory of  erstwhile exclusion means 
that ever-deeper embeddedness in the EU’s varia-
ble geometry – from the Schengen Area through 
the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) to 
the fiscal compact and the informal camp of  fis-
cally prudent members of  the eurozone – became 
construed as a worthy political objective in and 
of  itself. There was an implicit assumption that 
the EU framework would remain strong, and that 
deeper integration within the EMU would bring 
clear economic rewards to the new EU members – 
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an assumption later harshly tested by the financial 
and sovereign debt crisis. For an influential group 
of  liberal economists centered around the Finance 
Minister Ivan Mikloš, the EU and OECD acces-
sion also signified the best institutional context for 
economic catching up with Western Europe and 
for shaping national responses to globalization. 
1.2. Champion of market reforms 
In the early 2000s, Slovakia successfully cultivated 
an image of  a country that was business-friendly, 
fiscally prudent, and blessed with a lean state. The 
first package of  austerity measures was passed in 
1999 and included a reform of  public finances to 
rein in fiscal spending (which had spiraled out of  
control during the Mečiar period) and the privatiza-
tion of  state-owned banks. The clean-up from bad 
loans and recapitalization of  the banking sector 
came at a direct cost of  about 11 percent of  GDP 
covered by the state budget. The largest banks were 
then sold to new owners (Austrian and Italian ban-
king groups). As a result, the Slovak banking sector 
is now in much better shape than it is in most EU 
countries, and local banks are among the healthiest 
among others in their parent groups. A reform-
oriented agenda helped Slovakia become a member 
of  the OECD in 2001.
In the 2002 elections, the surprising victory of  cen-
ter-right parties was partly due to the lack of  credi-
ble opposition and alternative. Campaigning as the 
only safe option for completing accession to the 
EU and NATO, the second Dzurinda government 
used the new mandate to implement ambitious 
reform packages on tax, health care, pension, and 
social systems. 
An overhaul of  the tax system was introduced in 
2004. A flat tax of  19 percent was applied to all 
goods, as well as personal and corporate income. 
Taxes on property, inheritance, and dividends were 
abolished. While the reform was successful in redu-
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GDP per Capita of the Visegrad Countries as a Percentage of the Euro Area (Figure 1)
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income segments of  the population were hit hard 
(previously, essentials like food and medicine had 
been taxed at 14 percent).
The reform was also controversial abroad, with 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder of  Germany, and 
Nicolas Sarkozy, then the French minister of  
finance, denouncing the tax reforms in new mem-
ber states as tax dumping. The recurring debate on 
tax harmonization in the EU is thus looked upon 
with considerable skepticism; as a result, Slovakia 
allies itself  with the Baltic States, Ireland, and the 
UK against what many see as Franco-German 
efforts to limit the competitive advantages of  other 
EU countries. 
The country’s newfound political and economic 
stability, together with a flat tax rate and attractive 
investment incentives, meant that Slovakia saw 
a boom in foreign direct investment (FDI), and 
the automotive industry emerged as a key target. 
Investments started with Volkswagen in the early 
1990s and sped up with investments by KIA and 
PSA Peugeot Citroën in the first half  of  the 2000s, 
attracting a large number of  automotive parts 
manufacturers. In 2013, the country produced 
more cars than Italy (930,000) and remained the 
largest global producer on a per capita basis. The 
automotive industry generates some 26 percent 
of  Slovakia’s total exports and 20 percent of  total 
imports and forms the backbone of  the country’s 
industrial sector. 
Between 2002 and 2008, in the “Tatra Tiger” 
period, the country enjoyed high economic growth. 
In terms of  per capita GDP (with the EU average 
as 100 percent), it was able to narrow the gap 
to the frontrunner Czech Republic from 18 to 8 
percentage points and even to overtake Hungary 
before the 2009–10 crisis. (See graph.)
1.3. Qualifying for the eurozone 
The economic growth and market reforms of  the 
early 2000s laid the groundwork for Slovakia’s drive 
to eurozone membership. In this ambition, econo-
mic arguments – and Slovakia’s capacity to meet 
the Maastricht criteria – aligned with the prevailing 
political discourse of  EU integration as an over-
riding goal. Little changed after the 2006 election, 
as Smer-Social Democracy, led by Robert Fico, 
formed a coalition with the ultra-nationalist SNS 
and Mečiar’s HZDS. Despite the government’s 
mixed track record on protecting the rights of  eth-
nic minorities, the momentum of  EU integration 
continued. New efforts were concentrated on joi-
ning the Schengen Area in 2007, the EMU in 2009, 
and lifting the remaining restrictions to the free 
movement of  persons within the EU.9 These goals 
and the related agenda created a diplomatic and 
administrative overload in Bratislava’s EU policy-
making. Until 2009, there was simply less time and 
resources in the otherwise limited administrative 
and personnel capacities of  the Slovak government 
for pursuing national interests in other EU policies 
and agendas. 
The ministry of  finance, together with the nati-
onal bank, had already prepared a strategy at the 
time when the country entered the EU, proposing 
a target date for EMU membership of  2008–09. 
The main argument for an early adoption of  the 
euro was Slovakia’s very open economy. In 2006, 
foreign trade turnover accounted for around 160 
percent of  the GDP, and of  that, over 80 percent 
was settled in euros. In absolute terms Slovakia’s 
economy was about half  the size of  that of  Hun-
gary or of  the Czech Republic. Thus the reduced 
exchange rate risks and transaction costs that euro-
zone membership would entail for Slovak exporters 
were persuasive arguments. Slovak GDP growth 
had also been reliant on foreign direct investment, 
which was expected to increase, owing to both 
investors’ perception of  stability and reduced tran-
saction costs and exchange rate risks. Traditionally, 
the most significant economic drawback – the loss 
of  monetary sovereignty – had little significance 
for Slovakia. The effectiveness of  Slovak monetary 
policy was already limited due to the size of  the 
country’s economy as well as deregulated capital 
flows and foreign impulses.10
Political support for EMU membership was a 
key factor in Slovakia’s successful membership 
bid. Support was almost unanimous in the Slovak 
parliament, both on substance and on timing. Of  
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the six parties, only the Christian-democrat Party 
KDH was against joining the euro, fearing that the 
cessation of  monetary sovereignty would harm the 
weakest segments of  society.11 
After joining the ERM II system in December 2005 
and meeting the final inflation criterion in August 
2007, Slovakia adopted the euro in January 2009 
(two years after Slovenia). In joining the Euro-
zone, Slovakia was no longer playing catch-up but 
became a frontrunner in the region. 
However, Slovakia was unable to bear more fruit 
from its eurozone membership, with the collapse 
of  Lehman Brothers in New York occurring three 
months before the country abandoned its national 
currency. Instead of  the hoped-for boom in invest-
ment and trade, FDI plateaued, exports tanked, and 
the economy went into a short recession. Never-
theless, the country was able to spring back from 
the crisis relatively quickly, with exports picking 
up within two quarters, and modest GDP growth 
returning in 2010.
In the run-up to the global economic crisis, Slovak 
banks proved very cautious lenders, and Slovakia 
avoided the credit boom associated with eurozone 
membership and the credit bust associated with its 
crisis. However, the ensuing Slovak recovery has 
been largely jobless, with unemployment continuing 
to plague the country. The average unemployment 
rates (over 14 percent in 2013) conceal high regio-
nal differences, with the southeast of  the country 
recording rates of  over 20 percent.12
1.4. National controversies
Throughout the first decade of  membership, Slo-
vak politics allowed little scope for a eurosceptic 
insurgency (with the sole exception described 
below). While the Lisbon Treaty enjoyed broad 
support,13 its ratification was delayed by a domestic 
power struggle and row over a controversial law 
limiting press freedoms pushed forward by the 
first Fico government. The center-right opposition 
refused to provide the votes necessary to meet the 
constitutional majority required for ratification of  
Lisbon without guarantees from the Fico govern-
ment to change significantly the media legislation 
seen as a threat to the quality of  democracy in the 
country. In the end, it was the Hungarian-minority 
party that broke the stalemate and voted with the 
ruling coalition parties to ratify the treaty even wit-
hout changes to the media law. 
Back in 2006, the SMER-SD party was initially 
reserved about the EU agenda and flirted with a 
nationalist agenda. Eventually, it adopted a pro-
European position – in part to gain international 
and domestic legitimacy after a power-maximizing 
deal taking two small populist parties as junior coa-
lition partners – the notorious Ján Slota’s extremist 
Slovak National Party (SNS) and Mečiar’s fading 
HZDS. Their effort to rewrite the rules over mino-
rity policy triggered considerable pressure from EU 
partners and institutions (leading to a suspension 
of  the membership of  SMER-SD in the Party of  
European Socialists from 2006 to 2008).
The most visible exception to the pro-EU consen-
sus came in the 2010–11 period, when Slovakia 
opted out from the first Greek bailout (€110 bn) 
and became one of  the chief  critics of  what it saw 
as the “moral hazard” of  eurozone bailouts. At 
meetings of  euro group finance ministers, Slovakia 
demanded stricter rules for debtors as well as their 
tough enforcement, including automatic sanctions. 
There were differences of  opinion within Iveta 
Radičová’s center-right coalition on bailout mecha-
nisms, all of  which Bratislava supported in the end. 
The fate of  the Radičová government was sealed, 
however, when a new liberal party, Freedom and 
Solidarity (SaS) and junior coalition partner, refused 
to support the country’s participation in the Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). By October 
2011, Slovakia remained the only eurozone country 
that had not ratified it. In the previous weeks, Slo-
vak leaders were waiting for the votes in the Ger-
man and Dutch parliaments hoping that the ratifi-
cation would collapse before it reached the Slovak 
parliament. That did not happen, although votes in 
both the Bundestag and the Dutch parliament pro-
ved controversial. In order to enter into force, the 
EFSF rescue mechanism had to be ratified by all 
eurozone members: there was enormous pressure 
on Bratislava from the EU institutions and relevant 
partners. 
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In a last-minute bid to persuade the party to pro-
vide the necessary votes for ratification, Prime 
Minister Radičová linked the vote to a vote of  
no-confidence for her own cabinet. Undeterred, 
the majority of  SaS MPs abstained, bringing about 
the government’s collapse after only 15 months 
in office. In the end, Radičová and other leaders 
of  the government coalition accepted help from 
the opposition SMER-SD party to get the bailout 
package approved in parliament, in exchange for 
early elections (won in a land-slide by Fico’s party). 
The episode captured another Slovak attitude to the 
EU at the time: a populist revolt at home against the 
EU’s solidarity with its indebted southern members. 
Contributing to rescue funds for richer countries that 
had behaved irresponsibly with their debts and public 
finances was deeply unpopular in a country that was 
poorer (Slovakia’s per capita GDP of  $21,000 compa-
red to Greece’s $32,000 at purchasing power parity in 
2010) and had had to undergo painful transformation 
and adjustment in order to join the EU.
Moreover, key positions in Radičová’s cabinet were 
held by the chief  architects of  the liberal economic 
reforms of  the early 2000s (the finance minister, Ivan 
Mikloš, and the foreign minister, Mikuláš Dzurinda), 
who maintained that bailouts would help only if  
the debtor countries were able to stick to structural 
reforms to remain credible for the markets. 
In the end the episode proved unique. The image of  
Slovakia as the eurozone’s enfant terrible did not last 
long, and Slovakia remained a constructive, predic-
table, and stable partner in the following years. The 
euroscepticism of  the SaS, while prominently tou-
ted in the election, failed to gain significant traction 
among voters (the party received 5.8 percent of  votes 
in 2012, down from 12.1 percent in 2010).
2. Perspectives
This part will describe the formation of  Slovak 
national preferences and views on EU institutional 
issues. It will then discuss the national perspec-
tive on regional cooperation, energy policy, and 
the country’s trade and economic profile and 
partnerships. 
Slovakia’s continuing enthusiasm for European 
integration – even amid the economic crisis – 
stems from a combination of  structural factors 
and idiosyncrasies tied to national legacies and 
discourse. The former are clear to see. Having an 
extremely open economy and mostly trading with 
EU partners, the country’s future is existentially 
wedded to the success of  the European project. 
Policymakers in Bratislava are acutely aware that 
any fracturing of  the eurozone would have a 
domino effect on the Slovak economy and upend 
the very fabric of  society, to say nothing of  the 
country’s geopolitical anchorage and external secu-
rity. On the other side, Slovakia stands to gain a lot 
from »more Europe«. For instance, a truly common 
EU energy policy would help alleviate Slovakia’s 
dependence on Russian supplies, just as the com-
pletion of  the single market would provide an addi-
tional boost to exporters. Another structural factor 
pertains to power plays inside the EU. As a small 
member state, Slovakia has been well aware of  the 
risks involved in the gradual abandonment of  the 
community method in favor of  new intergovern-
mentalism. In the past, Bratislava has positioned 
itself  among the European Commission’s best 
friends and emphasized that its long-term national 
interests would be best served by a strong, cohesive 
Union.
But the structural logic of  objective national inte-
rests fails to capture the distinctive pedigree of  
Slovakia’s pro-EU consensus, as described above. 
Shaped by the trauma of  having been left out initi-
ally, EU integration was never framed in Bratislava 
as a fateful loss of  national sovereignty, as was the 
case in many member states. Rather, in Slovakia’s 
discourse, it has been perceived as a marker of  
the country’s success. Eurozone membership, for 
instance, is seen as a point of  pride: a symbol of  
how far Slovakia has come from the mid-1990s 
when it was seen as the “black hole of  Europe”.14 
This pride is also reflected in opinion polls. Bet-
ween 1999 and 2008, national pride increased from 
75 percent to 88 percent, corresponding to the low 
and high points of  the country’s EU integration.15 
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2.1. The formation of national preferences
The flip side of  Slovakia’s commitment to EU 
integration is that it conceals the lack of  interest – 
of  political elites and voters alike – in the process 
itself. Policy formulation is technocratic rather than 
political and often more ad hoc than systematic, 
depending on the actual configuration of  influen-
tial players. European policy choices in Bratislava 
thus seem to emerge almost by default instead of  
growing out of  any longer-term strategy. Impor-
tant matters of  Slovakia’s EU policy are not widely 
debated in public, and relevant discussions are usu-
ally kept among small groups within the political, 
business, and bureaucratic elite. While voters are 
periodically reminded of  the necessity of  Slovakia’s 
presence at the core of  EU and EMU integration 
dynamics, the implications or reasoning behind it 
are rarely spelled out and discussed (save for deba-
tes over the eurozone bailouts).
Public attitudes toward the EU are characterized by 
the same combination of  support and disinterest. 
For instance, according to Transatlantic Trends 
survey data from October 2013, over 60 percent of  
Slovaks assess the country’s membership in the EU 
and the eurozone positively. In the EU, only Ger-
mans and Poles are more positive. And yet, voter 
turnout in the 2004 and 2009 European Parliament 
elections was the lowest among all member states: 
16.9 and 19.6 percent, respectively.16
It is therefore difficult to distil a consistent orde-
ring of  Slovakia’s national preferences when it 
comes to the future institutional architecture of  the 
EU. Similar to other small member state capitals, 
Bratislava has also been suspicious of  enhanced 
inter-governmental coordination in the eurozone, 
possibly based on contractual agreements outside 
the Treaties. Rather, Slovak diplomacy has leaned 
toward a more inclusive and communitarian model 
but remained skeptical of  any radical leaps forward, 
including a possible treaty change. So far, govern-
ments in Bratislava have proved tactically astute in 
navigating such contradictions without alienating 
any of  the principal players, above all Germany, 
and the European Commission. Slovak leaders, 
from both the ruling SMER-SD party and the 
mainstream center-right opposition, share a strong 
belief  that, in the emerging multi-speed EU, the 
country must wind up in the fastest lane – but they 
care comparatively little about the construction 
itself. 
There is also very little reflection of  it in academia, 
owing to a limited pool of  informed experts and a 
lack of  high-quality research on the EU. As a result, 
few independent experts apart from the “privile-
ged players” are able to monitor the government’s 
performance and to reflect critically on Slovakia’s 
policy choices in the EU. The base of  experts and 
participants in the public debate on EU issues is 
much smaller than in other Visegrad countries, 
which results in less domestic scrutiny over Slovak 
positions at EU summits. 
In his 2009 study of  Slovakia’s EU policy forma-
tion, Marek Rybář concluded that the majority of  
actively pursued Slovak positions and preferences 
are a result of  ideological and bureaucratic con-
cerns of  the privileged players (the political elite, 
business groups), rather than of  the government’s 
consultation with societal groups.17 A notable 
exception is the Catholic Church’s strong influence 
on the national position on cultural issues in the 
EU context. Back in 2004, in reaction to the Hague 
program of  mutual recognition of  national court 
rulings within the EU, the Slovak government 
issued a unilateral declaration that Bratislava would 
not support family law harmonization. This policy 
line has been respected also by the current center-
left government, which in its Program Manifesto 
(April 2012) declares its intention to focus on the 
following EU policies: energy, transport infrastruc-
tures, internal market, and the environment. It has 
also pledged to engage in active consultation with 
civil society and social partners on thematic prio-
rities for Slovakia’s EU presidency in the second 
half  of  2016 (following the next parliamentary 
elections).
2.2. EMU, EU institutional affairs, and fiscal 
integration
Under the Fico government, Slovakia’s policy on 
EMU institutional reforms oscillated between 
enthusiasm for more Europe and aversion to 
radical positions and innovative ideas. Consider 
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Slovakia’s stance on the two overarching debates on 
the future of  Europe: the principles of  austerity-
versus-growth and intergovernmentalism-versus-
community. In both, the government crafted posi-
tions that reflected Slovakia’s interest in genuine 
integration, as well as the Smer party’s ideological 
proclivity to Keynesian economics, while striving 
to minimize the political costs of  doing so. So far, 
Prime Minister Fico has proved tactically astute in 
navigating such contradictions without alienating 
any of  the principal players (Germany, France, and 
the European Commission). At the same time, lea-
ders in Bratislava have always been mindful of  the 
preferences of  Berlin, as it is the country’s most 
important EU partner. 
Likewise, on the issue of  a possible treaty change 
to pave the way for a genuine political union, Slo-
vakia is unlikely to oppose it but equally unlikely to 
advocate it. Notwithstanding its objections to the 
first Greek bailout in 2010, Slovakia supported all 
of  the EU’s crisis measures of  2010–13, and even 
joined the vanguard of  countries pushing ahead 
with the financial transaction tax initiative. Most 
recently, during Council discussions leading up to a 
decision on the banking union, Slovakia even stood 
for a common resolution mechanism – initially 
opposed by Germany – that would see member 
states lose control over the fate of  troubled banks. 
Afterward, Fico repeatedly stressed that neither 
banking union nor fiscal compact are enough to 
restore the EU’s competitiveness and that more 
integration is needed, including in fiscal matters. 
In reality, however, the model of  fiscal integration 
envisioned by the government in Bratislava is far 
from sweeping; it merely implies closer coordina-
tion in the Council and Slovakia’s potential entry 
into contractual agreements on structural reforms, 
as long as it remains of  a voluntary nature.
Slovakia has been generally supportive of  deeper 
political and fiscal integration based on the EMU, 
including the Fiscal Union. However, there are 
clear limits to Slovakia’s willingness to give up fiscal 
sovereignty. One such »red line«, referred to expli-
citly by Fico, concerns the budgetary authority of  
national parliaments.
At the EU summit of  December 2013, Slovakia 
insisted on a voluntary nature of  contractual 
arrangements and solidarity mechanisms. Fiscally 
responsible eurozone countries should not be puni-
shed and forced to enter legally binding arrange-
ments with the European Commission. 
The underlying concern in Bratislava seems to be 
twofold: 
1) Burden sharing in solidarity mechanisms for 
southern European countries will go against 
new eurozone members and hurt their fragile 
fiscal positions. Southern member states should 
not have the motivation to postpone reforms 
until they are rewarded with financial support 
from joint solidarity mechanisms. Slovakia 
therefore favors loans rather than non-return 
grants and bailouts. 
2) The Fiscal Union has to be open to all EU 
partners, otherwise it will deepen divisions in 
the region and undermine Slovakia’s relations 
with its Visegrad neighbors. The choice of  
whether to participate in the Fiscal Union and 
in contractual arrangements should be left to 
eurozone and non-eurozone member states to 
decide alike. 
As for solidarity mechanisms, it was crucial from 
the Slovak point of  view to agree not only to 
clear benchmarks but also on contribution criteria. 
Bratislava is concerned about national allocations 
and the impact on its own fiscal position at home. 
Public debt in Slovakia is forecast to rise very 
close to 57 percent of  the GDP in 2014. Under 
the constitutional law on budget responsibility 
(2011), public debt above this level obliges the 
government to submit a balanced budget, which 
means either making considerable cuts in state 
expenditure or raising taxes. 
On macroeconomic issues, Slovakia supports the 
relaxation of  austerity and a shift of  focus toward 
job creation, warning that the current pace of  
fiscal consolidation might be choking economic 
growth. But the attitude is largely rhetorical. The 
Fico government treasures Slovakia’s affiliation 
with the German-led »northern« camp of  fis-
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cal prudence too much to become a champion 
of  a progressive alternative to the conventional 
wisdom.
The same balancing act characterizes Slovakia’s 
positions on the future of  the EU and EMU insti-
tutional architecture. Being a small country whose 
interests lie in preserving the integrity of  European 
Community institutions and treaties, Slovakia sup-
ports a strong role for the European Commission. 
For instance, Bratislava explicitly endorsed the 
Lisbon-enabled innovation tying the selection of  
the Commission President to results of  European 
Parliament elections in May 2014, thus conferring 
greater democratic legitimacy onto the Commis-
sion. The Smer party even took the step of  putting 
Maroš Šefčovič, current vice-president of  the Com-
mission and Slovakia’s presumptive for another 
mandate as commissioner, at the top of  its EP 
election list. 
2.3. External policies
Upon entering the EU, Slovakia’s diplomacy opted 
to focus on the neighboring regions of  the Western 
Balkans and Countries of  the Eastern Partnership 
(Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova). Actively shaping the 
EU’s role toward these regions has perhaps been the 
most consistent Slovak priority in its EU policyma-
king. Bratislava deserves credit for an assertive, deep 
engagement with the most advanced EU membership 
aspirants in the Western Balkans (Montenegro, Mace-
donia, and Serbia) and also for its long-term focus on 
Belarus, where it has pressed for political liberalization 
of  the Lukashenko regime. 
Slovak political leaders and diplomats have played 
a key role in various stages of  the EU enlargement 
process in the Western Balkans, including in an early 
opening of  the accession talks with Croatia in 2005 
and in Montenegro’s successful referendum on inde-
pendence from Serbia a year later. The current Slovak 
foreign minister, Miroslav Lajčák, served in 2006 as 
the special representative of  the EU’s High Represen-
tative Javier Solana for Montenegro, and in 2007–09 
in the doubly unpopular position of  the international 
high representative/EU special representative in Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Linguistic and cultural proximity, 
historical ties, and the Slovak ethnic minority in Serbia 
and Croatia have also been important connecting 
points. So is the country’s own example as an attrac-
tive model of  economic transition and EU integration 
for individual Balkan governments.
While it is one of  five EU countries that does not 
recognize Kosovo as a state, Slovakia has been 
strongly encouraging of  Serbia to improve relations 
with Kosovo. Together with Athens, Bratislava 
has kept the profile of  a more constructive “non-
recognizer” than Cyprus, Romania or Spain. The 
Slovak political elite is also divided on Turkey; the 
center-right camp prefers a privileged partnership 
instead of  full EU membership. The opening 
of  EU accession talks with Turkey in 2005 was 
the subject of  a heated parliamentary dispute in 
Bratislava, which split the center-right parties and 
resulted in a positive vote with no promise of  the 
prospect for Turkey’s future EU membership. The 
crucial support was provided by Fico’s Smer party, 
then in the opposition.
Slovakia also has very dynamic NGOs and medical 
doctors with a footprint in the EU official deve-
lopment assistance agenda. The latest scorecard 
publish ed by the European Council on Foreign 
Relations in 2014 praises Slovakia for development 
aid to Africa (South Sudan, Kenya) and for con-
sistent leadership in attempts to achieve a visa-free 
regime with the EU’s Eastern neighbours.18 How-
ever, in contrast to its engagement on behalf  of  
the Balkan region, Slovak diplomacy has not found 
its own niche in the EU’s Eastern policy, except 
perhaps in its continuous support for the democra-
tic opposition and fledgling civil society in Belarus.
2.4. Regional dynamics
Regional cooperation and coordination – above 
all in the Visegrad Group – plays a crucial role in 
Bratislava’s EU policy. Being the smallest and the 
most multi-ethnic country19 within the Visegrad 
Group (Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Poland, also known as the V4) – and the only one 
sharing a border with each of  the three others as 
well as with Ukraine – Slovakia has seen the Vise-
grad format as its vital interest and its core group 
of  partners within the EU and NATO. For Slovak 
diplomacy, the most effective way of  shaping EU 
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policies and decisions (except in the EMU issues) 
has been through the Visegrad format. Also, Bra-
tislava has become the most consistent defender 
of  the V4’s present format. Potentially expanding 
the group to involve a single new country would 
require consensus of  all four present members. 
Since all direct EU neighbors are already in, and 
Austria has not been interested, preferring its own 
regional initiatives instead, Slovakia does not have 
any interest in enlarging this regional grouping. 
But that position has other reasons as well. The 
so-called “Visegrad revival” was possible only after 
post-Mečiar Slovakia “returned” to the region 
in 1999, and the group members then supported 
Bratislava’s fast-track EU integration. The “V4 Plus 
formula” has moreover proved very useful and fle-
xible for incorporating other external interests and 
partners of  the current Visegrad countries. 
During the first decade in the EU, the Visegrad 
Group has remained the only recognizable regional 
organization and trademark. On the EU level, the 
V4 has helped Slovakia build effective coalitions, 
supporting for instance, the continuation of  solid 
EU cohesion policy; more focus on energy security 
issues; EU funding for regional interconnectors; 
and upholding the EU principle of  freedom of  
movement against recent Dutch and British efforts 
to limit EU migrants’ rights to social protection.
In intra-Visegrad relations, the Hungarian-Slovak 
relationship is the most problematic one and has 
the potential to weaken the whole regional coope-
ration. The shakiness of  the current bond is the 
result of  historical developments, and remaining 
issues will need work to be solved over the long 
term. 
In the early 1990s, Slovak-Hungarian bilateral rela-
tions and the position of  the ethnic Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia were widely seen as a poten-
tially destabilizing factor within Central Europe. 
With the integration into the EU and NATO, 
however, this risk factor has been significantly mar-
ginalized. After Fico’s center-left Smer-SD party 
formed a coalition government with two smaller 
extremist parties in 2006, tensions with Hungary 
quickly escalated. A controversial, and vaguely 
defined amendment to the Slovak State Language 
Law (2009) was followed by a heated diplomatic 
spat between Bratislava and Budapest during the 
summer, which claimed that the new legislation 
breached European standards. One infamous epi-
sode in August 2009 included stopping Hungary’s 
then-president László Solyom at the border to 
prevent one of  his frequent private visits to ethnic 
Hungarians in Slovakia.20
The EU as well as the two countries’ European 
partners, including Germany, quickly stepped in, 
and both governments realized that their wider 
interests were at stake. As a result, both prime 
ministers met in September 2009 to agree on a ten-
point plan of  how to diffuse tensions. Prior to that 
meeting, Bratislava sent its state language law to 
the Venice Commission and entered into an expert 
dialogue with the OSCE High Commissioner on 
National Minorities, which resulted in corrections 
of  the most problematic parts of  the law. 
Despite the disputes, Slovakia and Hungary have 
developed a very constructive dialogue on EU 
issues, which has continued uninterrupted even 
during bilateral disputes. This pragmatic dimension 
became more apparent once the Radičová govern-
ment (2010–11), which included ethnic Hungarians, 
moved swiftly to address the complaints of  ethnic 
minorities and improve relations with Hungary. 
Though the Radičová government was short-lived, 
bilateral dialogue has since intensified significantly. 
The relative international position of  Fico’s Slo-
vakia compared to Viktor Orban’s Hungary, an 
improved perception of  Slovakia in Budapest, and 
an uneasy period in Hungary’s relations with Roma-
nia have been some of  the factors contributing to a 
gradual change of  paradigms. Most recently, Prime 
Ministers Fico and Orbán have reshaped bilateral 
agendas to focus on those issues where agreement 
was possible and on developing existing opportu-
nities in trade, economic cooperation, and cross-
border infrastructure. In mid-2012, Hungary joined 
the Czech-Slovak coupled electricity market, and 
contacts between the governments are becoming 
more frequent. A joint session of  the Slovak and 
Hungarian cabinets took place in July 2013.
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Without the EU and Visegrad frameworks, low 
points in the countries’ relationship would cer-
tainly have been much lower, and more drawn 
out. Common interests within the region and the 
EU make dialogue unavoidable. However, regular 
political dialogue has yet to spill over into a wider 
reconciliation and productive exchange on the two 
countries’ common but divisive history. While civil 
society and expert groups from both countries 
have taken inspiration from the Franco-German 
reconciliation, so far this has not been adequately 
supported by either government. 
2.5. Energy policy
The importance of  energy policy has increased 
substantially for Slovakia in the decade since EU 
accession, both in terms of  regional cooperation 
and EU policy. This section will concentrate on 
natural gas, nuclear power, and renewable resources, 
as these will be the most salient for the country 
from the perspective of  Visegrad cooperation and 
EU policy. 
Previously, Slovak energy policy was driven by two 
seminal events: first, the interruption of  gas supplies 
in the winter of  2009 due to a Russian-Ukrainian 
dispute and the economic damage that the interrup-
tion caused; and second, Germany’s 2011 decision 
to phase out its nuclear power plants by 2022. While 
this first prompted Slovakia to seek greater regional 
cooperation in order to bring energy security to the 
forefront of  EU policy, the second, by contrast, made 
the country keen to keep nuclear power (and the 
country’s energy mix) outside the EU’s purview.
The Slovak economy is among the most energy 
intensive in the EU. The current energy mix consists 
of  gas (30 percent), nuclear (22 percent), oil (21 per-
cent), and coal (20 percent), with renewable resources 
accounting for the rest (7 percent).21
The companies RWE and E.ON hold a 49 percent 
stake in the first and third largest electricity distri-
butors in the country respectively, and both are also 
large distributors of  gas. RWE has also until recently 
operated a combined-cycle gas turbine near Trnava 
but has mothballed it because of  lower than expected 
demand.
Gas plays a significant role in energy security cal-
culations. In one of  his first public comments after 
the Russian invasion of  Crimea, Prime Minister 
Fico reassured the Slovak public that, owing to a 
mild winter, the country had a five month supply. 
But while Slovakia’s restrained response to Russia 
was certainly informed by energy security consi-
derations, the Fico government has always tried to 
strike a more cautious line toward Russia than War-
saw and Prague have. 
At the same time, Slovakia is an important link bet-
ween Ukraine and the West, with a transit volume 
of  one-fifth of  European consumption. During 
2013, Slovakia undertook to upgrade its pipeline 
network to allow for substantial volume of  gas to 
flow eastward to Ukraine, thereby supporting its 
bid to reduce energy dependence on Russia. While 
negotiations had stalled after the association agree-
ment between the EU and Ukraine was suspended 
in the fall of  2013, the offer was again on the table 
following dramatic events in Crimea in spring 2014. 
At the time of  writing, this option of  reverse flow 
of  gas from Slovakia to Ukraine seems to be of  
crucial importance to the new government in Kiev. 
Otherwise, Slovakia lags behind Poland and the 
Czech Republic in diversifying imports and remains 
more dependent on Russia. The 2009 interruption 
of  gas supplies prompted investments in storage 
and reverse-flow capacities, with the lateral lowing 
emergency imports from the west. Low diversifi-
cation also has an impact on prices, with Slovakia 
currently paying 13 percent more for Russian gas 
than Germany, despite the shorter transit distance.
After the shelving of  the Nabucco Pipeline in favor 
of  the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), Slovakia has 
two hopes for diversifying its own gas supplies: 
connecting to an expanded TAP or to liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) terminals in Poland and Croa-
tia.22 Both assume expanded interconnectors. The 
successful cooperation of  Visegrad countries has 
borne fruit, with the north-south route accepted 
as a priority energy corridor, and with the EU co-
funding the main interconnectors between Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary.23
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Slovakia also has an interest in pursuing a common 
EU energy policy, with the hope of  gaining a better 
negotiating position on both price and supply dis-
ruptions when acting collectively.24
SPP, the Slovak natural gas company responsible 
for distribution and transmission (through its EU 
stream subsidiary), has since its 2002 privatization 
been part-owned by E.ON and GDF Suez. In early 
2013, however, the companies sold their 49 percent 
stake to EPH, a major Czech energy company with 
substantial backing of  a leading Slovak financial 
group (J&T). 
In stark contrast to Germany, nuclear power has 
strong support in Central Europe. In the case of  
Slovakia, nuclear power is popular among the pub-
lic and with parties across the political spectrum. 
The country’s share of  nuclear electricity produc-
tion is 55 percent (2012), the second largest pro-
portion in the EU after France. Slovakia sees this 
energy source as an important determinant of  its 
energy independence.
After the decommissioning of  two Soviet-type reac-
tors in Jaslovské Bohunice, which was a precon-
dition to the country’s EU accession, four reactor 
blocks are currently in operation, while two more, 
in Mochovce, are due to come online in the next 
several years. Another possible reactor, in Bohunice, 
is planned to be built by 2025. Last year Slovakia 
successfully lobbied the European Commission 
and the European Parliament to receive substantial 
funding – over 200 million euros – to defray the 
costs incurred in the decommissioning of  the two 
ageing reactor blocks in Jaslovske Bohunice in 2006 
and 2008. 
After Visegrad cooperation on nuclear energy fal-
tered, Slovakia and the Czech Republic formed 
the European Nuclear Energy Forum in order to 
further the issue at the EU level, but the forum 
failed to gain traction. Limited cooperation exists in 
practice; Slovakia has integrated electricity markets 
with the Czech Republic and Hungary, and Poland 
is negotiating joining them; research cooperation 
on a fourth-generation reactor prototype also exists, 
although funding is uncertain.
Indeed, the building of  further Slovak nuclear 
plants has come under considerable pressure. Ita-
lian energy company Enel’s postponement of  the 
commissioning of  the Mochovce plant reactors, 
amid battles with the government over additional 
funding, is unlikely to be the last. The Czech ČEZ 
group, a partner in the planned construction of  a 
new reactor at Bohunice, has retreated. Rosatom 
has signaled its willingness to fill the void but only 
under the condition of  guaranteed electricity rates. 
Challenges also remain when it comes to storage 
of  spent nuclear fuel, a part of  which Slovakia cur-
rently exports, mainly to Russia.
Visegrad cooperation can hope to solve some of  
these challenges by further increasing market inte-
gration in the region, hoping a larger market will 
attract investment. Furthermore, the V4 can be a 
vehicle for securing EU financing for both cross-
border electricity interconnectors and common 
spent fuel storage capacities.25
Slovakia has been an especially reluctant adopter 
of  renewable forms of  energy, even among the 
V4 countries. This sluggishness has been driven by 
concerns that the introduction of  feed-in tariffs 
will increase the price of  electricity, which is already 
among the highest in the EU,26 and discourage 
investments in other sources of  energy, particularly 
the country’s nuclear power plants.27
However, in recent years, concerns about the 
impact of  renewables, and particularly of  the 
solar farm boom, on the security of  the grid have 
become a major factor,28 with a recent study poin-
ting out that Slovakia would be unable to meet the 
targets set out in national renewable energy action 
plans without significant investments in cross-
border transmission capacities, particularly between 
Slovakia and Hungary, which could soak up peak 
supply.29
The problem of  grid security and the lack of  capa-
city for cross-border transmissions, is confounded 
by unplanned power flows between Germany and 
Austria. Because of  market design, these often 
take the route from wind farms in northern Ger-
many through Poland, the Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Hungary, and finally to Austria.30 The V4 has 
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cooperated on the level of  transmission system 
operators to bring wider attention to the problem 
and to argue for the necessity of  making changes 
in the market design.
When in 2010 the first Fico government dissol-
ved the ministry for the environment as part of  
cost-cutting measures, it sent a strong signal about 
its view on the agenda’s relative importance. And 
while the ministry was successfully re-established 
by the Radičová government, and the second Fico 
government has so far kept it in place, the agenda 
remains of  relatively little importance. Nevertheless, 
Slovakia is on track toward fulfilling 2020 targets 
(emissions 13 percent above 2005 levels) by a wide 
margin, driven mainly by structural changes in the 
economy and reduced energy intensity.31
Looking ahead, Slovakia has also been critical 
toward the European Commission’s proposal 
for 2030 climate goals. Like many other new EU 
member states, Slovakia sees the targets to reduce 
emissions by 40 percent (relative to 1990 levels) as 
detrimental to the competitiveness of  its industry, 
and it opposes setting a quota for renewables in the 
country’s energy mix.
2.6. Economic partnerships
Slovakia is the smallest and most open of  the Vise-
grad economies, with a ratio of  trade to GDP of  
almost 170 percent in 2012. As such, economic 
partnerships have a huge impact on the country’s 
foreign policy and EU relations. The country’s 
development in the past decade has been closely 
connected to rising exports and foreign direct 
investment (see figure 2). The crisis lowered Slovak 
exports by almost 20 percent in 2009. However, 
growth in exports quickly returned, reaching pre-
crisis levels in the second quarter of  2011.
Slovakia’s trade is predominantly EU focused, with 
its ratio of  inter-EU trade being one of  the highest 
in the Union (together with the Czech Republic 
and Cyprus). A total of  84 percent of  exports 
are to EU members, with 63 percent of  imports 
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originating there. Oil and gas imports from Russia 
represent almost a quarter of  imports from outside 
the EU.
Germany remains the largest trade partner in terms 
of  both imports (16.8 percent) and exports (21 
percent). This is in line with the rest of  the V4. 
However, the central position of  Slovakia in the 
region and its growing interconnectedness with 
Europe is responsible for the fact that its next 
biggest partners are the other three Visegrad coun-
tries, collectively responsible for over 17 percent of  
imports and 29 percent of  exports. Of  these, the 
Czech Republic is the largest trading partner, based 
on both the countries’ shared past and the tight 
integration of  their automobile sectors. 
Inter-Visegrad trade has enjoyed rapid growth in the 
past decade, outpacing growth of  trade with the rest 
of  the EU. Slovak exports to the Czech Republic, 
Poland, and Hungary grew from just over 7 billion 
euros in 2004, to over 18 billion in 2012. The growth 
of  trade among the V4 countries can be attributed to 
the activities of  foreign companies serving the region 
from individual countries as well as to inter-company 
trade from production segmentation.32
While the electronics and automobile sectors domi-
nate exports, worries about the impact of  this high 
export reliance and low export diversity have been 
largely overstated. The fact that Slovakia supplies a 
wide range of  cars (from SUVs to small family cars) 
has shielded exports from changes in consumer spen-
ding. Moreover, while exports to non-EU countries 
are the lowest in the region, exports to Germany are 
often re-exported to markets outside the European 
Union, a further protection from a fall in demand in 
Western Europe. The economic crisis had the most 
significant impact on exports to countries outside the 
single market, and exports here have still not returned 
to pre-crisis levels.
A favorable mix of  investment incentives, stability, and 
a business-friendly tax code attracted foreign investors 
in the early 2000s, leading to growth in employment, 
productivity, and a quickly appreciating currency. Loo-
king at the source of  investments, the vast majority 
originated from the eurozone, with the Netherlands 
(28 percent), Germany (15 percent), and Austria 
(14 percent) in the top three.33 Investment from the 
Czech Republic and Hungary is relatively high, with 
approximately 6 percent of  investments from each, 
while Poland accounts for less than 0.2 percent. For-
eign investments are mainly in manufacturing and 
financial services.34
Slovak companies increasingly invest abroad, 
mainly in the services and energy sectors.35 The 
close relationship with the Czech Republic is even 
more pronounced here, with over 41 percent of  
Slovak investments going to that country. This 
is followed by Cyprus (16 percent), Germany (7 
percent), Luxembourg (7 percent), and Hungary (7 
percent). Slovak investments in Poland account for 
approximately 1.5 percent of  the total.36
As economic growth slowed following the 2009– 10 
crisis, investment funds dried up or moved to more 
rapidly growing emerging markets. The recovery 
has seen relatively low amounts of  foreign direct 
investment, but its focus has changed. Recently, it 
has gone mainly toward upgrades and increasing 
the capacity and productivity of  existing plants, as 
opposed to new large “green-field projects” before 
the crisis, which brought with them additional 
opportunities for employment.37
As a recent report on the future of  Central Europe 
notes,38 the Slovak economy is moving from a 
stage in which it was driven by improvements in 
efficiency to one where it is “innovation driven”. 
And while the region in general is slow to invest in 
research and development, Slovakia in particular 
ranks among the lowest spenders on research and 
development in the EU. The transition toward 
growth based on innovation and high added-value 
exports seems distant.
As the report notes, cooperation with other Vise-
grad countries that have similar problems is ripe 
for improvement, with only a limited number of  
projects (for example in nuclear energy) currently 
under way. However, Slovakia will need to do its 
homework in improving policy and increasing its 
commitment to research and education.
Higher education in particular is in dire need of  
an overhaul, specifically in terms of  quality and 
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relevance to the needs of  the labor market. While 
secondary education has long held firm in PISA 
rankings despite chronic underfunding, it has 
dipped below OECD average in the most recent 
tests. 
Another problem that needs more attention is the low 
employment rate (65.1 percent in total), in particu-
lar for women (57.3 percent), which places Slovakia 
below the EU average. On top of  that, Slovakia faces 
major demographic and societal challenges with its 
young and growing Roma population.39 The vast 
majority of  Roma continues to live in poverty in soci-
ally vulnerable communities in Central and Eastern 
Slovakia. Their job prospects are limited by low skills 
and geographic separation from job opportunities in 
towns of  Western Slovakia – as well as by discrimina-
tion in the labor market. The European Commission 
has named Roma inclusion in its country-specific 
recommendations for Slovakia and encouraged it 
to use EU funds for targeted social programs. As a 
group, the Roma represent a significant yet underu-
tilized potential in the Slovak economy. Much of  the 
country’s future competitiveness will depend on how 
fast the government, regional administration and local 
mayors can improve the employability of  hitherto 
excluded Roma and help integrate their children into 
the mainstream education system. Regional collabo-
ration and exchange of  best practices with the Czech 
Republic and Hungary has so far been rather limited 
but could play an important role in the near future.
Conclusions
While Slovakia’s real income has grown rapidly in 
the past decade (outpacing the other V4 countries) 
and its per capita GDP now stands at over 76 
percent of  the EU-28 average (up from below 60 
percent in 2003), the country faces considerable 
challenges maintaining the pace of  convergence, 
and it risks becoming stuck in a middle income 
trap. Previously, economic growth was based on 
FDI and fuelled by low wages and growing produc-
tivity. With the FDI inflows dropping, the Slovak 
economy will have to look to a new model if  it is 
to continue lowering unemployment and increasing 
productivity and competitiveness.
Looking ahead, Slovakia’s consensus on Europe 
appears to be durable, at least in the medium term, 
barring any major economic disruption. As long as 
European integration commands public consent, 
no mainstream political party will have an incentive 
to break ranks. The fact that EU affairs are not 
subject to political contestation further reinforces 
the status quo. In the long term, however, absence 
of  an informed debate – especially on the impli-
cations of  deeper eurozone integration – and the 
capacity for populist revolt against the political 
establishment may render the domestic consensus 
in Slovakia more fragile than it appears today.
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